Skip to Main Content
Fan Engagement, Team Performance

Revisting the 2008 Wildcat Attack: How the Once-Visionary Formation Evolved Into the RPO

By: Gabe Schmittlein

On Sept. 21, 2008, the New England Patriots – winners of 21 straight regular-season games – welcomed the Miami Dolphins to town. The Dolphins – losers in 20 of their previous 21 regular-season games – were an afterthought as 12.5-point underdogs on that sunny afternoon.

As you might recall, the Dolphins stunned the Patriots 38-13 while introducing the league to the Wildcat, a formation that challenged the conventional structure of an offense and promised to revolutionize the league moving forward. At least, that’s what some believed at the time.

To say that the Dolphins invented the Wildcat, or even introduced it to the league, is really a misnomer. The play has a rich history. It was included (albeit under different names) in college playbooks at Pitt and Notre Dame in the early 1900s, bears a striking resemblance to the popular single-wing offense of the ’60s, and was even discussed in a ’98 scholarly article about the direct running back snap. In reality, the Wildcat is firmly ingrained in football’s past.

However, as Dolphins running back Ronnie Brown broke away on a 62-yard sprint for his fifth touchdown of the game, nobody was thinking about the past. People were thinking only of the future. This was a play that had taken down one of the league’s great dynasties. And a play that had seemingly baffled one of the greatest coaches of all time. It was a play that gave offenses optionality, big-play ability and short-yardage strength. The Wildcat was surely here to stay.

Miami Dolphins running back Ronnie Brown runs for a 62-yard touchdown during the fourth quarter of their 38-13 win over the New England Patriots on Sunday, Sept. 21, 2008.

Well, the future is now. The Patriots are still a dynasty, and the Wildcat has been run just 31 times through eight weeks of the 2019 season – about once every four games, according to Stats Perform’s proprietary X-Info data. This in-depth data has advanced college and pro play-by-play information and specialty stats such as yards after contact, burned defenders and more that are used by coaches, scouts and general managers, and provide compelling and unique content to broadcast and digital media clients.

We may be compelled to ask – what changed? How did the Wildcat offense, the purported formation of the future, become banished to the back page of playbooks? And what have offenses learned from it?

Well, there’s an easy answer to that first question. Not very many players, or teams, were actually good at running it.

As you might have expected, Miami’s Brown and Ricky Williams were particularly adept at it. Elsewhere around the league, Jets wide receiver Brad Smith (a quarterback in college) and Browns return man Josh Cribbs also had success. This group of aging running backs and undersized receivers embraced the Wildcat and, in turn, helped create the hype about the formation that perhaps overstated its actual effectiveness.

Outside of those specialists, there’s a distinct lack of high-usage, effective Wildcat rushers. Tashard Choice and Darren McFadden ran the Wildcat for above-average yards per carry but were used sparingly, while DeAngelo Williams and Shonn Greene ran the formation with some regularity but weren’t very effective. More recently, Derrick Henry and Mohamed Sanu (who excelled in the formation at Rutgers) have been able to carve a Wildcat niche for themselves but not in a high-usage role.

All-in-all, the vast majority of Wildcat runners have operated at below league-average yards per carry. Even backs as talented as LaDainian Tomlinson, LeSean McCoy and Fred Jackson struggled to have real success in the formation.

An underlying factor as to why league-wide Wildcat success has been difficult to come by is that the play isn’t as innovative as had been advertised. It’s an offense that has optionality only in theory. Just 7.7% of Wildcat plays since 2007 have been pass plays and those passes have been generally ineffective, with a completion rate of just 44.7% and an interception rate of 6.8%.

While runs from the Wildcat formation could be varied – through the use of counters, misdirections, and sweeps – they simply stopped fooling defenses over time. This has been particularly true in 2019, as Wildcat offenses are averaging just 3.58 yards per play – the previous low for a season was 4.33 in 2017.

The Wildcat may have seen its last days in the spotlight as a premiere play for NFL offenses, but it still has value as a trick play formation – the famous Philly Special from Super Bowl 52 was run out of a Wildcat formation – and is being used with relative frequency in red-zone sets.

Here’s Carolina Panthers running back Christian McCaffrey scoring back in Week 1 of this season after taking the snap and faking a handoff to quarterback Cam Newton:

The legacy of the Wildcat extends beyond its marginal use in modern game plans. The very core of the innovation – to provide the offensive team with an equal-man or man-up advantage by (in the case of the Wildcat) eliminating the traditional quarterback position – has become common practice in offenses. For the Wildcat, this man-up advantage has been offset by the defense’s ability to scheme for a relatively rigid offensive play type.

Elsewhere, though, this idea has survived and adapted.

Take the run-pass option (RPO), which became mainstream when Robert Griffin III entered the league in 2012 (some forms of the RPO existed before this, but they were generally not ‘true’ option plays). The RPO works to isolate a single player on the defensive side of the ball and the quarterback reads where that player is going before choosing to hand off or pull back for a pass.

If executed well, the offensive team achieves a man-up advantage for the chosen play type.

The RPO has already seen more widespread usage than the Wildcat ever did – both in terms of volume of plays run and league-wide adoption – and is on pace to see it’s highest usage yet in 2019.

That may be because a significant number of quarterbacks across the league have shown a proficiency in running the RPO. Mobile QBs who ran the RPO in college, like Newton and Marcus Mariota, have understandably been successful. What may be surprising is that stationary passers like Alex Smith and Andy Dalton have also been effective at it.

The RPO has shown a robustness across different players and different playbooks that the Wildcat never did.

In particular, young quarterbacks like Lamar Jackson, Baker Mayfield and Patrick Mahomes have been successfully running the RPO in high quantities.

This is likely a product of the RPO’s huge influence on the modern college game as well as the quick-read simplicity of the play as the quarterback is only responsible for making a single decision off a defender read.

Below you’ll see Jackson of the Baltimore Ravens running an RPO in Week 1 against the Dolphins. He waits until the safety commits to the run before pulling back and throwing the quick slant:

The RPO also generates legitimate optionality. Just 61.4% of RPO plays end in a run, with the remaining 38.6% resulting in a pass. Of those passes, a whopping 76.1% have been completed (understandable considering most RPO throws are short) and just 1.1% have been intercepted. These numbers represent a drastic improvement over the Wildcat offense.

Eleven years after we were introduced to the Wildcat, the NFL appears to have found its new play of the future, and it’s not all that different. The RPO may be lacking a signature moment – say, Brown’s five-TD game or the Philly Special – but it seems to have the qualities that make a play last.

That is, at least until the next new offensive innovation captures our hearts and minds.